Introduction: Although, according to Aristotle, God is the possessor of true philosophy, the human being can still set out on the path of philosophizing and partake of true philosophy to the extent of his capacity. This is a philosophy that seeks truth for the sake of truth itself, not for profit, benefit, fleeting bodily pleasures, or the refutation of an opponent. Hence, in the Aristotelian and Platonic tradition to which Farabi belongs, not everyone under any condition can engage in this science; the observance of moral virtues and the reform of character are closely tied to philosophizing and attaining true philosophy. This article, by examining Farabi’s extant works, investigates the relation between happiness and philosophy, as well as the place and role of ethics prior to and accompanying philosophy and ethics grounded in philosophy in attaining true philosophy and forming the true philosopher.
Findings: According to al-Farabi, three virtues—theoretical, deliberative, and moral—together with practical crafts are necessary for the worldly and otherworldly happiness of human beings in societies.
Philosophy, both in its general and specific senses, is a virtue and the sole path to happiness, because its ultimate end is knowledge of God and assimilation to Him. Therefore, philosophy as a whole is knowledge and action, and thus noble character, and it is precisely that through which true human happiness is realized.
True philosophy renders its possessor worthy of leading society; hence, for Farabi, the true philosopher is the prophet, the imam, and the king, and the path of cultivating philosophy is the very path of cultivating kingship.
Discussion: Following the Platonists, he considers philosophy the sole path to happiness. He believes that the worldly and otherworldly happiness of members of societies depends on the acquisition of theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues, and practical crafts. In his view, the final end of all theoretical sciences is the same as that of first philosophy: not only knowledge of the First Principle, but assimilation to the Divine—an end that constitutes both the perfection of human creation and the perfection of human character, and that depends on acquiring all four virtues.

Τo attain true philosophy—which is the sole path to the ultimate perfection and happiness of human beings—one must properly direct all one’s animal and human faculties: employ the appetitive and irascible faculties toward the attainment of true virtues, and guide the rational soul so that it does not fall into sophistry and falsehoods. With the help of ethics, one reforms one’s speech and conduct; through geometry, one prepares the mind fully to receive universal intellects and to analyze and understand philosophical matters; and through logic, one safeguards the mind from error and distinguishes truth from falsehood. Farabi explicitly states that anyone who wishes to understand Plato’s and Aristotle’s intent in composing philosophical works must first fully master logic and ethical discipline, and then proceed to natural science and metaphysics. In this way, one realizes that their sole aim was to identify the beings of the world as they truly are, to the extent of their capacity—not to invent, discover, utter strange novelties, display rhetoric, or merely encourage others toward this science.
Some have argued that the ethics required, from Farabi’s view, for the study of philosophy is a pre-philosophical ethics distinct from philosophical ethics grounded in theoretical philosophy. They regard pre-philosophical ethics as consisting of virtues that are commonly deemed noble and thus based on religious and customary virtues, and therefore non-philosophical and non-demonstrative. However, the religious, customary, and commonly accepted nature of pre-philosophical ethics does not render it non-demonstrative or non-philosophical, because, for Farabi, the origin of commonly accepted opinions (mashhūrāt) is philosophy. Since, according to Farabi, religion consists of determinate and limited opinions and actions prescribed by the first ruler of the city for a group of people, religion can be considered the source of these commonly accepted views. Yet, from Farabi’s perspective, the theoretical and practical doctrines of religion are derived from philosophy; therefore, the origin of commonly accepted opinions can ultimately be said to be philosophy. If philosophy is certain, these commonly accepted opinions will also be certain and correspond to reality; if it is conjectural, they too will be conjectural and not correspond to reality. Hence, pre-philosophical ethics is also grounded in philosophy and can be demonstrative or non-demonstrative (probabilistic), even though its acceptance as commonly accepted judgments is not accompanied by argument or demonstration and is made acceptable merely by their widespread acceptance. Such ethics is necessary both prior to learning philosophy and throughout it.
The relationship between pre-philosophical ethics and philosophical ethics may be likened to the relationship between pre-philosophical geometry and geometry as one of the mathematical sciences. Just as pre-philosophical geometry serves only to prepare and cultivate the mind of the learner for grasping deep philosophical concepts and discovering first causes, remaining general and elementary and not entering into the detailed study of geometry grounded in logic and arithmetic—so that one at this stage is not yet called a geometer—so it is with ethics. Pre-philosophical ethics is a general and universal ethics that merely places the human soul on the proper path toward acquiring true virtues, without engaging in the detailed issues discussed in the science of ethics, which is a branch
of practical philosophy and posterior to theoretical philosophy. At the stage of pre-philosophical ethics, a person is not called a moral philosopher; rather, he is simply a refined individual who strives, by observing moral standards, to make only the discovery of truth his guiding principle and ultimate aim. Therefore, both pre-philosophical geometry and pre-philosophical ethics are grounded in philosophy; yet, when they function as preliminaries and the starting point of philosophizing, they are employed—independently of their philosophical principles—to render the individual intellectually and morally disposed for attaining true philosophy.