This study examines the relationship between ethics and the mechanism of penal accountability, aiming to explain the inevitable and foundational role of ethics in the structure of criminal responsibility and to delineate its boundaries. It demonstrates that the attribution of criminal liability cannot be explained merely on the basis of violating a legal rule; rather, it presupposes establishing a form of wrongfulness at the normative level. Utilizing a descriptive-analytical methodology, the research relies on examining the conceptual links between moral blameworthiness, social order, and criminal responsibility. The findings indicate that the criminal justice system, although operating through binding legal rules, draws upon a value-based and ethics-centered foundation. Consequently, harmful behavior or conduct disruptive to public order is not intrinsically criminal unless it is first recognized as blameworthy at the level of collective conscience and moral standards. Accordingly, ethics plays a decisive role not only in justifying the principle of punishment, but also in defining the limits of state intervention and preventing the arbitrary expansion of the penal domain. The most significant conclusion of this study is that criminal responsibility is essentially moral-based; and the immorality of an act or conduct constitutes a necessary condition for its criminalization.