نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشیارگروه اخلاق دانشگاه تهران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
“The rule of 'Ughb al-‘Iqab bila Bayan’ (Ugliness of Punishment without Clarification) serves as the basis for the intellectual principle of presumption of innocence, according to which, if the current religious ruling is doubted by a person and no explicit statement has reached them, then no religious obligation is incumbent upon that person. Now, the rule of 'Ughb al-‘Iqab bila Bayan’ can be conceived as an independent intellectual proposition alongside statements such as ‘Justice is good’ and ‘Injustice is bad,’ which aids in understanding religious propositions. Given that this rule is an intellectual one, it can also be utilized to resolve ethical issues and make decisions regarding moral rulings. The present research aims, through an analytical method, to apply this rule in the analysis of moral acquittal (Barā’ah), moral epistemology, and moral transgression (Tajarrī). It is clear that, considering the fundamental nature and function of this rule within the framework of Sharia, one might expect this rule to be employed more favorably within the domain of monotheistic ethics. However, at the same time, it can be anticipated that such a rule would also be applicable to other ethical approaches. This research first explains the nature of the rule 'Ughb al-‘Iqab bila Bayan’ and its opposite—namely, the necessity of averting probable harm—and then addresses its function in issues related to moral acquittal, moral epistemology, and moral transgression.”
کلیدواژهها [English]
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