دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 Comparative Analysis of two Ethical Approaches—Optimistic and Pessimistic—toward AI Development, with a Focus on the Problem of the Responsibility Gap تحلیل مقایسه‌ای دو رهیافت اخلاقی خوش‌بینانه و بدبینانه به توسعه هوش مصنوعی با تمرکز بر معضل شکاف مسئولیت 7 24 106670 10.48308/jiethics.2026.241786.1030 FA مسعود طوسی سعیدی پژوهشکده مطالعات بنیادین علم و فناوری، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران. 0000-0001-8394-8507 Journal Article 2025 09 30 Introduction: This paper examines two contrasting ethical approaches to the development of artificial intelligence (AI): the optimistic and the pessimistic. Both approaches aim to analyze the ethical and human-centered dimensions of AI, yet they differ fundamentally in their assumptions and conclusions. The optimistic approach emphasizes AI’s potential to enhance human life and argues that ethical concerns are often based on speculative or non-specialist assumptions. In contrast, the pessimistic approach deems unrestricted AI development ethically unjustifiable due to unpredictable consequences, algorithmic bias, and the erosion of human decision-making capacity. The focal point of this paper is the “responsibility gap”—a dilemma that complicates the attribution of negative outcomes of AI systems to any specific individual or institution, raising profound questions about moral and legal accountability. The central question addressed is: which of the two approaches offers a more reasonable response to the responsibility gap? Findings: The optimistic approach is grounded in three core arguments: l The benefits of AI development outweigh its harms, and depriving societies of these benefits is ethically unjustifiable. l Pessimistic concerns often stem from non-expert perceptions, whereas specialists tend to offer more balanced and optimistic assessments. l Philosophical assumptions underlying pessimistic views—such as the claim that robots lack human-like qualities—remain unresolved and cannot serve as a decisive basis for restricting AI development. Conversely, the pessimistic approach draws on empirical evidence of AI’s problematic effects: l AI systems may possess unethical tendencies such as deception and malicious intent. l AI development leads to undesirable consequences like institutionalized inequality and diminished human autonomy, which cannot be ethically offset by potential benefits. l Ethical considerations should extend beyond normative human life to include potential harm to nature and ecosystems, threatening the very foundation of human existence. Regarding the responsibility gap, pessimistic thinkers such as Matthias and Sparrow argue that autonomous systems make it impossible to assign moral responsibility, especially in sensitive domains like warfare. Optimists like Danaher, however, view the gap as an opportunity to reduce the psychological burden of tragic human decisions, presenting it as a potential ethical advantage. Discussion: The paper offers an independent analysis that distinguishes moral accountability from moral worth, arguing that the responsibility gap in AI is no more complex than that found among humans. Epistemic uncertainty and lack of full control are inherent to all moral agents, and the emergence of intelligent entities is not fundamentally different from the birth of new human beings. Thus, ethical pessimism that rejects AI development due to the responsibility gap suffers from internal contradiction—if blameworthiness is a condition for moral legitimacy, then human reproduction itself would be ethically suspect. Accordingly, a combined neutral-optimistic approach to the responsibility gap is logically superior to absolute pessimism. This conclusion demonstrates the overall implausibility of the pessimistic approach and supports the preference for optimistic and neutral perspectives. این مقاله به‌طور مقایسه‌ای دو رهیافت خوش‌بینانه و بدبینانه نسبت به توسعه هوش‌ مصنوعی را با تمرکز بر معضل «شکاف مسئولیت» بررسی می‌کند. نخست مبانی هر یک از این دو دیدگاه تشریح می‌شود: در رهیافت خوش‌بینانه تلاش می‌شود بر مزایای چشمگیر هوش مصنوعی برای جامعه، فقدان نگرانی در میان متخصصان و عدم‌ قطعیت‌های فلسفی تأکید شود؛ در مقابل، رهیافت بدبینانه با استناد به سوگیری‌های الگوریتمی، افول توانایی تصمیم‌گیری انسانی و پیامدهای پیش‌بینی‌ناپذیر اجتماعی‌ـ اقتصادی، توسعه‌ بدون محدودیت هوش‌ مصنوعی را از نظر اخلاقی مردود می‌داند. پس از آن شکاف مسئولیت به‌عنوان معضلی بررسی می‌شود که امکان انتساب کامل پیامدهای منفی فنّاوری به فرد یا نهادی مشخص را از بین می‌برد و نمونه‌هایی از مواجهه با آن در نظام سلامت و سلاح‌های خودران ارائه می‌‌شود. در ادامه سه معیار محوری‌ـ مبنای خیر اخلاقی، دامنه قابلیت‌های متافیزیکی و عملی هوش ‌مصنوعی و آسیب‌پذیری انسان در رواج هوش مصنوعی به‌عنوان چارچوبی برای تحلیل معقولیت دو رهیافت مطرح می‌شوند، اما تحلیل انجام شده نشان می‌دهد هیچ‌یک از استدلال‌های ارائه‌شده ذیل رهیافت‌های خوش‌بینانه و بدبینانه به‌طور مطلق پاسخ قطعی به این معیارها نمی‌دهند؛ بنابراین استدلالی مستقل درباره میزان معقولیت رهیافت خوش‌بینانه و بدبینانه با تأکید بر معضل شکاف مسئولیت ارائه خواهد شد که براساس آن، رهیافت خوش‌بینانه نسبت به رهیافت بدبینانه معقول‌تر دانسته می‌شود. در پایان تأکید خواهد شد که این استدلال و معقول‌تر بودن رهیافت خوش‌بینانه نسبت به رهیافت بدبینانه به معنای بی‌احتیاطی در توسعه هوش مصنوعی و نادیده‌انگاشتن معضل شکاف مسئولیت نیست.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106670_42160c28eb6c1160ddbd85acec2a8ba5.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 The Unavoidable Role of Ethics in Evidence-Based Policymaking نقش ناگزیر فلسفه اخلاق در سیاستگذاری مبتنی بر شواهد 25 48 106660 10.48308/jiethics.2026.242364.1037 FA سید محسن اسلامی گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران. 0000-0003-3804-2428 Journal Article 2025 11 06 Introduction: Evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) has become a widely embraced approach across fields such as medicine, education, and public policy. This trend responds to past policy failures where decisions were often grounded in weak or irrelevant considerations. Despite the centrality of evidence, some argue that ethics, i.e., ethical evidence (most broadly construed), is irrelevant to EBPM. Findings: Arguments for “ethics-free” policymaking are motivated by concerns about relevance, objectivity, consensus, complexity, effectiveness, and analytical clarity. These arguments are too dismissive of ethical considerations in the sphere of evidence-based policymaking. However, there are also less pessimistic arguments that do not take ethics seriously in the domain of policymaking, i.e., the effectiveness argument and the separation argument. None of the above arguments works. For example, although considering ethics makes things complicated, it would be a mistake to ignore real complexities. Similarly, although effectiveness in some ways is beyond the reach of ethics, it matters that the goals aimed at are properly picked. Discussion: Even if policy exclusively relies on relevant evidence, it retains an intrinsic normative dimension. Emphasizing evidence is itself a normative claim: policymakers ought to base decisions on relevant facts rather than personal preference. The idea of being sensitive to reasons in forming beliefs is not a trivial matter. Furthermore, ethical considerations also guide how evidence is obtained and used. For instance, randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are ethically sensitive forms of evidence-gathering. RCTs are valuable since we cannot directly run some experiments due to ethical limits on research. Relevantly, there are epistemic and justice considerations about the sources we seek to gather evidence. Policies promoting diversity or inclusion rely on ethical reasoning to justify which perspectives are included in evidence collection (Fricker, 2007). Finally, engaging with evidence often raises normative questions, such as handling expert disagreement, conflicting societal beliefs, or biases revealed by “noise” studies (Kahneman et al., 2022; Eslami, 2023). Thus, normative considerations are unavoidable, underpinning both the selection and interpretation of evidence. Furthermore, on another level, ethical considerations in EBPM are diverse. For example, policymaking must identify what is important and why. This includes, for example, questions about human well-being, non-human life, and environmental sustainability (Broome, 2010; Heathwood, 2021; Nussbaum, 2000). Similarly, policy possibly should account for collective values, such as equality, justice, and fairness (e.g., Parfit, 1997). In sum, insisting on eliminating ethics from evidence-based policymaking without further good arguments would count as the opposite of the very idea of evidence-based policymaking. «سیاستگذاری باید براساس شواهد مربوط باشد»؛ این سخنی طبیعی و مقبول است. اجرای برنامه‌ای در دنیای واقعی برای حصول نتایج عینی مستلزم رجوع به شواهد مربوط می‌باشد و نمی‌توان با حدس و گمان یا نظرات شخصی و عرفی به چنین کاری پرداخت؛ اما گاهی این دیدگاه، یعنی سیاستگذاری شواهدمحور، حمل بر این می‌شود که اگر سیاستگذاری درست بخواهد براساس شواهد باشد، باید مستقل از اخلاق و اخلاقیات پیش برود که می‌توان این دیدگاه را «سیاستگذاری فارغ از اخلاق» نامید. برای ارزیابی بهتر این دیدگاه مناسب است به دو سؤال پاسخ داده شود: ۱. در سیاستگذاری چگونه باید شواهد مختلف را لحاظ کرد؟ ۲. در سیاستگذاری توجه به چه شواهدی بجاست؟ درباره پرسش نخست توضیح داده می‌شود که چگونه اساساً ایده حساسیت به شواهد خود هنجاری است و در پاسخ به پرسش دوم بیان خواهد شد که توجه به بعضی شواهد هنجاری ناگزیر است، هرچند این شواهد از انواع مختلفی هستند و نقش‌های متفاوتی ایفا می‌کنند. به طور کلی، توجه به این ابعاد ضمنی در سیاستگذاری کمک می‌کند که تصویر بهتری از نقش فلسفه اخلاق و حوزه‌های پژوهشی هنجاری در سیاستگذاری داشته باشیم. بسیاری از سؤالات کلیدی در عرصه سیاستگذاری نیازمند شواهدی تجربی هستند و توسل به باورهای اخلاقی رایج یا شخصی مخلّ تصمیم‌گیری درست است؛ با این حال در بعضی از ابعاد، توجه به ابعاد هنجاری ناگزیر می‌باشد. نکته این است که بخشی از شواهد مربوط همواره هنجاری هستند؛ از این‌رو «سیاستگذاری فارغ از اخلاق» عدول از ایده کلیدی در سیاستگذاری شواهدمحور است.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106660_c322a9154266fbbbba5bc3eda5abade4.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 Applying the "Ugliness of the Eagle of Belabian" Rule in Solving Ethical Problems کاربرد قاعده «قبح عقاب بلابیان» در حل مسائل معرفت اخلاقی 49 70 106394 10.48308/jiethics.2025.241670.1028 FA بهروز محمدی منفرد گروه اخلاق، دانشکده اندیشه اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. 0000-0002-6589-6704 Journal Article 2025 09 23 Introduction: In Usul (principles of jurisprudence), rational and textual discussions are organized to resolve jurisprudential and religious issues. However, its impact extends beyond Fiqh (jurisprudence) and can play a role in moral epistemology. Extending the principle of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān (the ugliness of punishment without clarification) to resolve issues in moral epistemology means it has the following applications as a Justified Practical Knowledge: l In confronting moral doubts; l As a source against moral epistemic skepticism; l Resolving issues of applying moral knowledge to concrete subjects. Findings: 1) The Nature of the Rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān The rational principle, Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān, states that punishing or blaming a person for performing or omitting an act, without a valid religious clarification (Shar’ī) or a sound rational argument (Dalīl 'Aqlī) for the obligation, is ugly (qubīh). Therefore, if an agent doubts the ruling of a religious act and has not received any valid clarification, reason deems the principle of Barā’ah (innocence/exemption) to prevail, and the obligation is negated. 2) The Rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān and Moral Epistemic Skepticism Moral epistemic skepticism asserts that access to certain moral truths is impossible. However, the rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān acts as a form of Justified Practical Knowledge, rescuing the skeptical agent from inability. 3) The Rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān: The Basis of Moral Exemption in Moral Doubt Moral doubt occurs when an individual knows general moral principles but is ambiguous about a specific action. In such situations, the rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān provides the rational basis for moral exemption (Barā’ah); meaning, after review and finding no valid clarification regarding the badness of an act, reason rules that the agent is exempt from moral blame and responsibility. The principle of moral exemption has two consequences: l A) Necessity of Non-Blame by the Observer (External Judge): l B) Moral Responsibility Following Moral Exemption: 4) The Rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān and the Challenge of Applying Moral Knowledge to Subjects The error of applying moral knowledge (Tajarrī Akhlāqī or moral transgression/ presumption) occurs when an individual intends to violate a moral law (e.g., lying), but their action, in reality, conforms to the actual moral ruling (they tell the truth). Based on the rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān: Since the agent in this state lacks valid clarification regarding the wrongness of their current act (because their knowledge was erroneous), reason rules for their moral exemption. Therefore, moral transgression resulting from a misapplication error entails no moral blame or responsibility (neither based on intention nor result), because accountability without clear clarification is ugly. Discussion: By utilizing discussions from Usul studies, one can achieve a deeper understanding of the role of “Clarification” (Bayān) and the level of moral awareness in the possibility of acting upon the contents of moral propositions. From this perspective, the rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān is not merely an Usūlī rule confined to Fiqh, but rather an epistemological foundation for moral judgment in cases of doubt. This rule, as a rational criterion, enables decision-making regarding behaviors or attitudes whose moral wrongness or badness lacks clear clarification. Hence, it can be considered a basis for moral exemption and the organization of moral epistemology in doubtful situations. پژوهش حاضر به بررسی امکان بهره‌گیری از قاعده عقلی قبح عقاب بلابیان در حوزه معرفت اخلاقی می‌پردازد. این قاعده که در علم اصول مبنای اصل برائت عقلی به شمار می‌رود، دلالت بر این دارد که در صورتِ نبودِ بیانِ روشن درباره حکمِ شرعیِ فعلی، هیچ‌گونه الزام یا استحقاق عقاب بر انسان مکلّف متوجه نخواهد بود. از آنجا که این قاعده اساساً عقلی است، می‌توان دامنه مفهومی آن را به قلمرو اخلاق نیز گسترش داد و آن را به مثابه معرفت عملی موجه در مواجهه با مسائل معرفت اخلاقی دانست. بر این اساس پژوهش حاضر سه هدف اصلی را دنبال می‌کند: 1. به‌کارگیری قاعده قبح عقاب بلابیان در مواجهه با شکاکیت معرفتی اخلاقی؛ 2. کاربست آن برای حل تردید اخلاقی در مقام عمل و 3. پاسخ به چالش تطبیق معرفت اخلاقی بر موضوعات مشتبه. فرایند پژوهش بدین شکل است که در بخش نخست، ماهیت قاعده قبح عقاب بلابیان و نقطه مقابل آن، یعنی قاعده دفع ضرر محتمل بررسی و سپس کارکرد این قاعده در حوزه معرفت اخلاقی تحلیل می‌شود. نتیجه پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که هرچند این قاعده در بافت شریعت اسلامی معنا و کارآمدی بیشتری دارد، می‌توان آن را در چارچوب اخلاق توحیدی و حتی سایر نظریه‌های اخلاقی به ‌منزله ابزاری برای حل مسائل معرفت اخلاق یادشده به کار گرفت.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106394_da03c56706e8bd70decfb15fff7d5d3f.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 The Ethical Principles of Dealing with Pandemic Diseases from an Islamic Perspective اصول اخلاقی مواجهه با بیماری‌های فراگیر با رویکرد اسلامی 71 92 106719 10.48308/jiethics.2026.106719 FA محمدجواد فلاح گروه اخلاق اسلامی، دانشگاه معارف اسلامی، قم، ایران (نویسنده مسئول). 0000-0003-2128-1326 طیبه قائمی بافقی دانشجوی دکتری مدرسی اخلاق اسلامی، دانشگاه معارف اسلامی، قم، ایران. 0009-0002-6766-7400 Journal Article 2026 02 03 Introduction: Epidemic diseases have always been one of the greatest challenges for human societies, testing not only physical health but also social and ethical cohesion. Confronting these crises requires an ethical framework that can balance the preservation of individual lives with social responsibilities. This research aims to explain and present practical ethical principles for dealing with infectious diseases, based on Islamic ethical criteria and sources. Using a descriptive-analytical method and drawing from library resources, this paper endeavors to examine the virtue-based, teleological, and deontological dimensions of this confrontation, providing an operational framework for ethical policymaking during crises. Method: This research is descriptive-analytical and employs a library-based approach. Necessary data were gathered through the study and collection of credible jurisprudential, ethical, and social sources related to the principles of human interaction during crises and illness. The extracted principles were then compared and analyzed against the foundations of Islamic ethics. The main focus is on extracting practical ethical guidelines for daily social interactions during disease outbreaks. Findings: The conducted investigations led to the extraction of seven fundamental principles of practical social ethics in responding to epidemics. These principles are: The Principle of Rights-Based Approach (Rights of the Patient and Society): Emphasizing respect for the fundamental rights of individuals, including the right to health and the right to necessary care, without discrimination. This principle is rooted in Islamic teachings regarding human dignity and the obligation to respect the rights of believers and even non-believers. The Principle of Companionship and Empathy: The necessity of establishing emotional connection and providing psychological support to patients and families affected by the disease, as a human and religious duty. Islam emphasizes the importance of affection and mercy among believers, and this principle gains even greater significance during crises. The Principle of Mutual Recommendation (Enjoining Truth): The social responsibility of individuals to convey accurate and timely health information and refrain from spreading harmful rumors. The verse, “And advise each other to truth, and advise each other to patience” (Surah Al-Asr, Verse 3), emphasizes this principle. The Principle of Mutual Support (Financial/Practical Assistance and Sympathy): The obligation to provide financial and practical assistance to those economically and socially harmed by the disease. The principles of brotherhood (Mu’akhah) and cooperation in Islam make this an essential tenet. The Principle of Dignity and Respect: Preserving the human dignity of patients and those on the front lines of treatment, even under the harshest conditions of quarantine or illness. Respect for parents and elders in Islam is an example of this principle on a broader scale. The Principle of Non-Maleficence (Avoiding Harm): The ethical duty of all individuals to adhere to protocols to prevent the transmission of the disease to others, which is considered a form of harm to others. The jurisprudential maxim “La dharara wa la dhirar” (No harm shall be inflicted or reciprocated) forms the basis of this principle. The Principle of Tranquility and Serenity: Striving to maintain the psychological stability of society by avoiding emotional reactions and refraining from fueling unnecessary fears. Islam emphasizes peace of heart and reliance on divine decree. Discussion: These seven principles form an synergistic set that defines the ethical “dos and don’ts” in social interactions during crises. The main challenge in implementing these principles lies in the tension between individual duty (such as self-preservation) and social duty (helping others). Islamic ethics, by emphasizing the concept of reciprocal obligation, aligns these two. For instance, non-maleficence requires small daily sacrifices that collectively lead to the preservation of public health. Neglecting any of these principles can lead to the collapse of social trust and increased vulnerability for the most at-risk groups. The emphasis on Islamic teachings in this regard provides a stronger guarantee for adherence to these principles, as they are considered divine obligations rather than mere customary laws. هدف از این پژوهش، ارائه اصول اخلاقی در مواجهه با بیماری‌های فراگیر براساس معیارهای اخلاق اسلامی است. این مواجهه از وجوه مختلف فضیلت‌گرایانه، غایت‌گرایانه و یا وظیفه‌گرایانه ‌بررسی می‌شود. این نوشتار به روش توصیفی‌ـ تحلیلی و مبتنی بر تحقیق کتابخانه‌‌ای به تبیین اصول اخلاق اجتماعی در مواجهه با بیماری‌های واگیردار می‌پردازد و مهم‌ترین چالش‌های اصول پیش‌گفته را موردتوجه قرار می‌دهد. مهم‌ترین اصول اخلاق اجتماعی کاربردی در مواجهه با اپیدمی‌ها؛ اصل حق‌مداری، اصل همراهی و همدلی، اصل تواصی، اصل مواسات، اصل تکریم و احترام، اصل عدم اضرار، اصل آرامش و سکونت می‌باشد که ناظر به خط‌مشی‌های اخلاقی در شرایط بحرانی بیماری‌ها سامان‌یافته است. این اصول بیانگر بایدونبایدهای اخلاقی در تعاملات اجتماعی و به‌ویژه مسئولیت‌های اخلاقی افراد در نحوه حضور در اجتماع و مواجهه اخلاقی با بیماران و آسیب‌دیدگان با محوریت آموزه‌های اسلامی ارائه شده است.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106719_5c264c4536b7749a122d5208c9684fc7.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 Declining Moral Values in Society: Identification of Concepts, Examination of Causes, Impact Assessment, and Provision of Solutions کاهش ارزش‌های اخلاقی در جامعه: شناسایی مفاهیم، بررسی علل، پیامدیابی و ارائه راهکارها 93 128 106672 10.48308/jiethics.2026.242791.1043 FA مظهر بابایی گروه آموزش ابتدایی، دانشکده علوم تربیتی، دانشگاه فرهنگیان، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول). 0000-0003-1383-0532 جمیله مرادی دانش‌آموخته آموزش ابتدایی، آموزگار مقطع ابتدایی، مریوان، ایران. 0009-0002-7283-0268 Journal Article 2025 12 05 Introduction: Ethics and moral life are fundamental pillars guiding humans toward a higher existence. Moral conduct shapes interpersonal relationships and determines inner growth, mental well-being, and social cohesion. Societies recognizing morality as a vital principle are more resilient against corruption, violence, and distrust (Ferdowsi & Arzani, 2018). Islamic teachings also emphasize moral excellence; the Qur’an states: “And indeed, you are of a great moral character” (Surah Al-Qalam, verse 4, trans. Fooladvand, 1994). However, younger generations today show reduced adherence to traditional moral values. Technological changes, economic fluctuations, social media, and regional conflicts have collectively weakened core values such as honesty, loyalty, and respect (Moghaddam, 2015). Some consider ethics merely a private or spiritual matter, overlooking its direct social and material impact. Recent studies highlight the ongoing importance of ethics in modern contexts. Zhou et al. (2023) stressed that morality is essential across all aspects of life, including education and business. Okipu (2022) demonstrated the critical role of ethics in teaching, showing that unethical behavior adversely affects both students and the education system. Karma Sherpa (2018) emphasized that professional ethics significantly influence students’ behavioral development. This research focuses on student-teachers at Farhangian University in Kurdistan Province during the 2023–2024 academic year. As future educators, their ethical perspectives are crucial for transmitting values to the next generation. The study aims to identify ethical concepts that have diminished over time, analyze the causes and consequences of moral decline, and provide practical solutions grounded in cultural and religious traditions to strengthen and revive moral values in contemporary society. The findings offer insights into the ethical status of the academic community and can inform effective cultural and educational policy-making. Findings: This study shows that in today's society, several moral concepts have become less important than in the past. Among the most important of these concepts are respect for elders, honesty, loyalty and keeping promises, responsibility, kinship, modesty, trustworthiness, contentment, helping others, empathy, justice, chastity of speech, and faith. The main reasons for this decline include the influence of the media and cyberspace, increased individualism, economic pressures and financial crises, disregard for moral values, cultural changes (especially the effects of globalization), increased corruption, diminished worship of God, social injustice, weakening of the role of the family, illiteracy and lack of awareness, materialism, decreased social trust, and the promotion of inappropriate role models. This decline in moral concepts has led to numerous negative results and consequences in society. These consequences include an increase in family problems and divorce rates, a decrease in mutual help and empathy, an increase in theft and fraud, the spread of lying, an increase in unhealthy competition, the emergence of antisocial behaviors, an increase in addiction, the creation of social insecurity, the spread of mental and psychological illnesses, the failure to pursue responsibilities, an increase in distrust and disrespect, an increase in suicide rates, an increase in the level of tension and fighting in society, and finally, the replacement of falsehood with truth. Discussion: This research aimed to investigate ethical values, the reasons for their decline, and strategies for their revival from the perspective of Farhangian University students in the academic year 2024-2025. Findings indicate a significant decrease in fundamental ethical values such as respect for elders, honesty, loyalty, responsibility, and earning lawful sustenance compared to the past. This decline is relative and context-dependent, accompanied by cultural and media transformations. Key reasons for this trend include the influence of media and cyberspace, increased individualism, economic pressures, Westernization, corruption, diminished religious beliefs, and the weakening of the family institution. The consequences manifest socially (theft, lying, mistrust), familially (increased divorce, reduced respect), and individually (suicide, irresponsibility). پژوهش حاضر با هدف شناسایی و تحلیل علل کاهش ارزش‌های اخلاقی، پیامدها و ارائه راهکارهای مقابله با آن از دیدگاه دانشجویان دانشگاه فرهنگیان انجام شد. این پژوهش با رویکرد کیفی، پارادایم انتقادی و روش تحلیل مضمون صورت گرفت. مشارکت‌کنندگان دانشجویان دانشگاه فرهنگیان استان کردستان در سال تحصیلی 1404-1403 بودند که به شیوه هدفمند انتخاب و روش جمع‌آوری داده‌ها مصاحبه نیمه‌ساختاریافته بود که تا رسیدن به اشباع نظری مورد بررسی قرار گرفتند. یافته‌ها در چهار محور اصلی به دست آمد: ۱. مفاهیم اخلاقی کم‌رنگ‌شده مانند صداقت، مسئولیت‌پذیری و همدلی؛ ۲. عوامل مؤثر بر کاهش ارزش‌ها از جمله رسانه و فضای مجازی، فشار اقتصادی و الگوهای نامناسب؛ ۳. پیامدها شامل افزایش طلاق، رفتارهای ضداجتماعی و بی‌اعتمادی؛ ۴. راهکارهایی برای احیای ارزش‌های اخلاقی همچون آموزش در مدارس، تقویت نهاد خانواده و معرفی الگوهای مثبت. نتایج نشان داد کاهش ارزش‌های اخلاقی پدیده‌ای چندوجهی است که چالش‌های گسترده‌ای ایجاد می‌کند؛ با این حال، اجرای راهکارهای پیشنهادی می‌تواند تا حدی در احیای این ارزش‌ها مؤثر باشد. تلاش برای تقویت و نهادینه‌سازی ارزش‌های اخلاقی، ضرورتی اساسی برای سلامت روانی و بقای جامعه است.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106672_381addb1a42055a445307d91fa59ff86.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 Paradigm for Enhancing Applied Ethics Research: A Case Study of Iranian Information Technology Ethics Research الگوواره به‌سازی پژوهش‌‌های اخلاق کاربردی: بررسی موردیِ پژوهش‌‌های ایرانیِ اخلاق فنّاوری اطلاعات 129 152 106659 10.48308/jiethics.2026.240827.1017 FA حسینعلی رحمتی گروه اخلاق کاربردی، پژوهشکده اخلاق و روان‌شناسی اسلامی، پژوهشگاه قرآن و حدیث، قم، ایران. 0009-0008-7613-9849 Journal Article 2025 07 25 Introduction: Given the growing societal demand for ethical research on applied issues, and considering that conducting such research—particularly when carried out by academic institutions—entails significant material and human resources, it is essential to critically evaluate and analyze existing applied ethics research in Iran. Such evaluation should address both the content and the research process, aiming to identify shortcomings and propose solutions for optimizing their impact. The ultimate goal is to enhance the effectiveness of these studies in raising ethical awareness, strengthening ethical motivation, and resolving or mitigating ethical dilemmas among their audiences. Since a comprehensive assessment across all domains of applied ethics is not feasible, the present article adopts a case study approach, focusing on Information Technology Ethics (ITE), with particular emphasis on cyberspace and artificial intelligence. A critical analysis of research in this field requires identifying deficiencies, understanding their underlying causes, and proposing remedial or mitigating strategies. The author has previously examined the first two aspects in a separate article; the current work presents a paradigm for enhancing the quality of IT ethics research, structured around three phases: pre-research, research, and post-research. Findings: The findings of the present study indicate that addressing or mitigating the shortcomings and challenges associated with ethical research in our country necessitates the consideration of a set of strategic measures. These include: Establishing specialized centers for research in information technology ethics, Fostering systematic collaboration among existing research institutions in this field, Founding an academic discipline dedicated to information technology ethics, Training specialized researchers in this domain, Creating a comprehensive database and a communication network for IT ethics scholars, Enhancing international academic exchanges, Compiling authoritative reference resources for research, Conducting generative research based on the ethical teachings of Islam, Prioritizing interdisciplinary research initiatives, Incorporating foresight studies on the future of information technology ethics, Translating Iranian research into other languages, Launching specialized academic journals, Producing diverse and multiple outputs from research findings. Discussion: Characteristics of an Ideal Applied Ethics Study: The hallmarks of a robust applied ethics study encompass the following: possessing scientific depth and content rigor; utilizing ethical theories, and preferably, the ethical teachings of Islam; adhering to the discourse of ethical science; exhibiting analytical, critical, and comparative qualities; prioritizing the needs, issues, and ethical challenges of contemporary Iranian society (while maintaining a perspective on global issues, particularly concerning emerging subjects like information technology and artificial intelligence); maintaining an applied focus aimed at resolving or mitigating harms and deficiencies; laying the groundwork for further studies and research; critically analyzing the existing literature on the subject; and demonstrating innovation by avoiding repetitive topic selection. Necessary Steps for Improvement: To achieve an optimal state in line with these characteristics, three essential tasks must be undertaken: Identifying the shortcomings inherent in existing applied ethics research, Determining the factors and contexts that give rise to these shortcomings, Finally, proposing solutions to resolve or mitigate them. Case Study Selection and Focus: Given the impracticality of performing such a comprehensive analysis across all domains of applied ethics research, the author of this article has selected "Iranian Information Technology Ethics (ITE) research" as a case study. Furthermore, within the broad spectrum of technologies, the present written work focuses specifically on cyberspace and artificial intelligence. The rationale for selecting this domain is threefold: First, its emergent nature can serve as a model for researching other new ethical topics required by society. Second, it aligns with the author's specialized field of study and research over the past two decades. Third, there is a lack of similar work in this specific area. Scope and Objective of the Present Article: Among the three aforementioned necessary tasks, the author has previously examined the first two—namely, the deficiencies in Iranian IT ethics research and their contributing factors—in a separate article. The present article addresses the third task: presenting a paradigm of solutions and recommendations for remedying or reducing those deficiencies and enhancing the productivity of applied ethics research, with specific attention to IT ethics studies in Iran. Research Method: The research methodology is characterized as a content-based, library-analytical, and applied investigation پژوهش درباره مسائل و موضوعات اخلاق کاربردی در کشورمان هرچند امری ضروری و متداول است، ولی همواره می‌بایست از نظر محتوا، روش و فرایند مورد آسیب‌شناسی قرار گیرد و برای اصلاح کاستی‌ها و بهبود فرایندها چاره‌اندیشی شود. با توجه به آنکه انجام چنین کاری درباره همه حوزه‌های اخلاق کاربردی مقدور نیست، مقاله حاضر به بررسی موردی اخلاق فنّاوری اطلاعات (اَخفا) می‌پردازد. آسیب‌شناسی پژوهشی در این زمینه مستلزم شناخت خود کاستی‌ها، عوامل و زمینه‌های ایجاد آنها و ارائه راهکار برای حل یا کاهش آنهاست. نویسنده در مقاله‌ای دیگر، دو مورد اول را بررسی کرده، و در مقاله پیش‌رو به مورد سوم می‌پردازد؛ در این راستا الگوواره‌ای ارائه می‌شود که ناظر به سه مرحلۀ پیشاتحقیق، تحقیق و پساتحقیق در زمینه اخلاق فنّاوری اطلاعات است و می‌تواند به عنوان الگویی برای پژوهش در این حوزه و دیگر شاخه‌های اخلاق کاربردی به کار رود. برخی از راهکارهای ارائه‌شده از این قرار است: تأسیس مراکز پژوهشی و راه‌اندازی رشته‌های خاص اخلاق فنّاوری اطلاعات، تربیت محققان متخصص در این زمینه، تدوین منابع پژوهشیِ مرجع، انجام پژوهش تولیدی براساس آموزه‌های اخلاقی اسلام، اهتمام به پژوهش‌های بین‌رشته‌ای، توجه به آینده‌پژوهی اخفا، افزایش تعاملات جهانی، ترجمه پژوهش‌های ایرانی به زبان‌های دیگر، ایجاد بانک اطلاعات اخفاپژوهی و شبکه ارتباطی اخفاپژوهان داخلی و خارجی، انتشار مجلات تخصصی و تولید خروجی‌های متعدد و متنوع از آثار پژوهشی.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106659_69d1b8358063618fdc5a6ac660fd242d.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 Moral Guides in Imami Kalam: A Re-reading of the Foundations of Ethical Exemplarism in the Theological Thought of Shaykh Tusi پیشوایان اخلاقی در کلام امامیه؛ بازخوانی مبانی اسوه‌شناسی اخلاقی در اندیشه کلامی شیخ طوسی 153 174 106673 10.48308/jiethics.2026.242900.1044 FA حسین زارع گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشکده پزشکی، دانشگاه علوم پزشکی همدان، همدان، ایران. 0009-0001-0566-6122 وحید پاشایی گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه بوعلی سینا، همدان، ایران. 0000-0001-5990-4205 حمیدرضا قربانی مبین گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه صنعتی قم، قم، ایران (نویسنده مسئول). 0009-0006-3853-2645 Journal Article 2025 12 14 Introduction: This research analyzes the foundations of ethical guidance methodology (rahnamā‑shenāsi) in the theology of Shaykh Tusi. It explores the intrinsic link between ethics and theology in Shi‘a thought, focusing on the role of divine leaders in guiding humanity toward felicity. Using a descriptive‑analytical and rational‑textual method, the study examines Tusi’s views on prophecy, imamate, and the characteristics of divine guides as ethical models. The core thesis posits that Tusi establishes a coherent ethical guidance system based on the necessity of the Infallibles, emphasizing Ismah, A‘lamiyyah (greatest knowledge), and Afḍaliyyah (superiority) as pillars of moral exemplarity. Findings: 1- Virtue Ethics and Exemplarism: The framework aligns with Virtue Ethics, prioritizing character cultivation (stating “Be like this”) over mere adherence to rules. Like Aristotle’s emphasis on virtuous individuals for discerning the mean, the Shi‘a tradition introduces the Prophet (PBUH) and Imams (AS) as supreme ethical exemplars. 2- Theological Basis: Prophecy and Imamate: Tusi mandates the appointment of prophets and Imams based on the Divine Principle of Lutf (grace). A) Prophecy: A Prophet (Nabi) receives direct divine knowledge. Their mission is inherently ethical: reason identifies general moral principles, while Sharī‘ah provides specific rulings. Prophetic teachings harmonize with human fiṭrah (natural disposition). B) Imamate: Tusi considers Imamate rationally necessary, grounding it in Lutf. The Imam is the perfect embodiment of divine commands, ensuring social good and preservation of the Shari’ah until Judgment Day. This role requires the Imam’s Ismah (infallibility) to guarantee correct interpretation and implementation of divine law. 3- Attributes of Divine Guides: Key Imamate attributes include knowledge of governance and immunity from error. The most crucial traits, following Ismah, are: A‘lamiyyah: Comprehensive knowledge of law and public interest. Afḍaliyyah: Moral and spiritual superiority over the community. Courage: Essential for leadership and jihad. 4- Moral Education and Motivation: Tusi’s ethics is virtue‑based, defining felicity as Qurb Ilāhī (proximity to God). Motivation centers on attaining divine satisfaction. Prophets and Imams, by embodying ethical perfection, provide the strongest incentive. Their example challenges worldly motives, asserting that true dignity belongs exclusively to God (Qur’an 2:165), making Īthār (altruism) the ultimate ethical act. Guidance (Hidāyah) is defined as Divine Lutf directing humanity toward obedience and reward, establishing the structure of ethical obligations. Discussion: Shaykh Tusi integrates theology (Kalām) and ethics, presenting prophets and Imams as moral exemplars whose guidance reinforces a virtue‑based ethical system dependent on humanity’s transcendent needs. اخلاق در تفکر شیعی با مبانی کلامی پیوندی عمیق دارد و راهنما‌شناسی اخلاقی به عنوان یکی از ارکان آن، نقش رهبران الهی (انبیا و امامان) را در هدایت بشر به سوی سعادت برجسته می‌سازد. پژوهش حاضر با هدف تبیین مبانی راهنما‌شناسی اخلاق در اندیشه کلامی شیخ طوسی، متکلم برجسته امامیه به بررسی آثار وی می‌پردازد. با بهره‌گیری از روش توصیفی‌ ـ تحلیلی و رویکرد عقلی ـ نقلی بر پایه اسناد کتابخانه‌ای و نرم‌افزارهای علمی، گزاره‌های کلامی شیخ در محورهای نبوت، امامت، ویژگی‌های راهنمایان الهی (عصمت، اعلمیت، افضلیت، علم و اشجع بودن) و نقش آنها در تربیت اخلاقی تحلیل شد. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که شیخ طوسی با تأکید بر حسن و وجوب بعثت انبیا و امامت معصومان بر پایه قاعده لطف الهی، نظام اخلاقی هماهنگی را تبیین می‌کند که در آن، رسولان و امامان به عنوان اسوه‌های اخلاقی، معرفت اخلاقی را فراهم می‌آورند و انگیزش اخلاقی را از راه هدایت (لطف در واداشتن به توحید و ثواب) و دوری از ضلالت تقویت می‌کنند. این نظام، رویکرد فضیلت‌گرا و واقع‌گرا را در اخلاق هنجاری ترویج می‌دهد، ذهنیت‌گرایی را نفی می‌کند و سعادت اخلاقی را در قرب الهی می‌بیند. نتایج پژوهش بر جامعیت نظریه شیخ در پیوند کلام و اخلاق تأکید دارد و می‌تواند مبنایی برای مطالعات میان‌رشته‌ای فراهم آورد.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106673_46bf9c33d33c9e4bd744541f3a99b77b.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 The Negative and Positive Roles of Virtues in Acquiring Knowledge from Sadra's Perspective نقش سلبی و ایجابی فضائل در تحصیل معرفت از دیدگاه صدرا 175 192 106661 10.48308/jiethics.2026.242141.1034 FA سیده زینب حسینی دانشجوی دکتری مبانی نظری اسلام، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول). 0009-0009-2829-5668 ابراهیم نوئی گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و ادیان دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران. 0000-0002-5785-2189 Journal Article 2025 10 24 Introduction: The mere existence of the soul as a potentiality has the ability to move towards higher understanding and unity with the active intellect. However, internal and external obstacles manifest through the driving forces of the soul, such as lust and anger, which prevent the soul from progressing on this path and make the activity of the cognitive faculty vulnerable. Some of these obstacles are existential, while others are non-existent. With the realization of states as existential moral virtues, knowledge is attained, and humans reach a higher understanding. The removal of these obstacles is the responsibility of these very states and moral virtues. From Sadra's viewpoint, the benefits of these states and moral virtues are not limited to their non-existent and negative aspects; he also acknowledges their existential and positive dimensions. In fact, the deepening of virtuous traits through consistent good actions plays a positive role in facilitating the acquisition of knowledge. Findings: The evolution and perfection of the soul are tied to the acquisition of knowledge. Therefore, the obstacles to gaining knowledge are also the obstacles to human perfection. Sadra identifies barriers to the soul's progressive movement towards the active intellect and connection to scientific grace, explaining that certain causes and reasons hinder the manifestation of truths upon the soul. Immoral actions and ethics serve as internal existential factors that lead to the loss of the soul's perfection or act as barriers to its remaining veiled. With every action performed by the soul, an effect occurs within it. If the action is tainted by lust or anger, it becomes a barrier to the possible perfection of the soul; conversely, if it is rational, it will contribute positively to the soul's deserving perfection. Thus, the soul's submission to lusts and desires deprives humans of understanding truths and knowledge, preventing them from reaching scientific grace. In this regard, sins and moral vices, which stem from the diseases of the heart, are considered among the most fundamental and significant obstacles to the soul's perfection and the attainment of divine knowledge and philosophical truths. Discussion: Human souls have the potential to attain perfection through knowledge and action, and the connection to the realm of abstraction is possible both inherently and potentially for the human soul. If there are no obstacles, the soul continues on its path to perfection. In this context, internal obstacles manifest through the driving forces of the soul in the form of lust and anger, which hinder its movement along this path and make the cognitive faculty vulnerable. The love of wealth and status has been identified as the most significant factors leading to desires. Moral vices can sometimes entirely obstruct the emergence of knowledge or hinder its realization, while at other times, they prevent the advancement of knowledge and lead to a potential distancing from perfection. نفس انسانی بنابر فطرت خود شایستگی و شأنیت شناخت حقایق اشیا را داراست و اگر مانعی در میان نباشد، نفس با این اقتضائش به مسیر تکاملی خود ادامه می‌‌دهد تا به سرمنزل مقصود برسد. البته موانعی بر سر راه حرکت استکمالی نفس به سوی عقل فعال و اتصال به فیض علمی وجود دارد. پژوهش حاضر به منظور پاسخ به این مسئله سامان یافته است که در نگاه صدرالمتألهین شیرازی چه موانعی در این میان وجود دارند و چگونه می‌‌توان آنها را کنار زد؟ مقاله با روش توصیفی و تحلیلی به بررسی موانع و حجاب‌‌های وجودی داخلی مانند رذائل اخلاقی و معاصی و رفع آنان پرداخته و تأثیر رذائل و فضائل اخلاقی در فرایند حصول معرفت را تبیین کرده است. یافته‌های پژوهش بیانگر آن است که رفع مانع رذائل اخلاقی و معاصی و آلوده شدن به مهلکه شهوت و غضب با تزکیه نفس و کسب فضائل حاصل می‌‌شود. این رفع موانع اموری سلبی و عدمی هستند و در اصل مقصود نیستند؛ در واقع کسب علم و معرفت، مقصود حقیقی انسان‌‌هاست و نفس پس از رفع موانع مقتضی به مسیر خود ادامه می‌دهد و به معرفت الهی و کشف حقایق اشیا دست می‌‌یابد. با افزودن قاعده «ضرورت سنخیت علت و معلول» می‌‌توان نقش فضائل اخلاقی در برطرف کردن موانع و تجانس نفس با عقل فعال را پذیرفت. پس از زدودن آلودگی‌‌ها و رذائل، فضائل شأن ایجابی تسهیل‌کنندگی برای تحصیل معرفت را دارند.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106661_6dbb0e8016e3dc202a8bc82b6713c027.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 An Analysis of the Semanto-Linguistic Relation between “Tâqwā” and “Iḥsān” in the Qur’an تحلیلی از رابطۀ معناشناختیِ واژگانیِ «تقوا» و «احسان» در اخلاقِ قرآنی 193 218 106695 10.48308/jiethics.2026.242174.1035 FA علی‌اکبر عبدل‌آبادی گروه حکمت و کلام، دانشکده الهیات و ادیان، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران. 0009-0004-8374-2639 مسعود زین العابدین دانش‌آموخته دکتری فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه تربیت دبیر شهید رجایی، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول). 0000-0002-4172-2777 Journal Article 2025 10 25 Introduction: The “Semantic Method” is one of the best methods for studying the semantic structure of the Qur’anic words, and it is of a great significance in semantic researches. In this article, using this method, we have undertaken a lexical semantic analysis of the two Qur’anic terms “Tâqwā” and “Iḥsān”, and have enumerated their semantic organs and semantic qualities on the basis of the Qur’anic verses, since the concepts denoted by these two terms have a special and distinguished position in Qur’anic ethics. It should be noted that the expressions “Semantic Organ” and “Semantic Quality” are proposed and explicated here for the first time within the framework of the “Lexical Semantic Analysis” method. We have explained that semantic organs are the constituents and formative components of meaning which, in a dynamic and living relationship, lead to the formation and emergence of meaning; whereas semantic qualities refer to the characteristics that are present in the meaning of a word and in its semantic organs, such as continuity and hierarchical gradation. These two components play a crucial role in the extraction of the meanings of Qur’anic vocabulary and can render semantic analysis more precise. For this purpose, all the Qur’anic verses containing the roots (w-q-y) and (ḥ-s-n) were examined, and the verses that were useful for extracting the semantic organs and semantic qualities of the two Qur’anic terms “Tâqwā” and “Iḥsān” were identified. Findings: Based on the Qur’anic verses, we have concluded that “Islām”, “Imān”, and “ʿAmal-e Ṣāliḥ (Righteous Action)” are the semantic organs of “Tâqwā”, while “protectiveness and safeguarding”, “hierarchical gradation”, and “continuity” constitute its semantic qualities. Likewise, “Imān”, “Tâqwā”, and “ʿAmal-e Ṣāliḥ” are the semantic organs of “Iḥsān”, and “bestowal (favor)”, “quality-seeking”, and “advancement and compensatory orientation” are its semantic qualities. Discussion: On the basis of the Qur’anic verses cited in the text of article, Islām, when accompanied by righteous action, gives rise to Imān. Imān, when coupled with Tâslīm, leads to Tâqwā. Likewise, Imān accompanied by righteous action results in Tâqwā. Moreover, the conjunction of Tâqwā and righteous action leads to Iḥsān, and the combination of Imān and Tâqwā gives rise to Iḥsān. These judgments indicate a hierarchical relationship between these concepts, in which each plays a fundamental role in the generation of a new meaning. Accordingly, in examining the relationship between the concepts of these terms, we identified two types of relations: the “relation of production” and the “relation of increase.” This means that Islām and Imān, as the two principal semantic organs of Tâqwā, lead to the production of the concept of Tâqwā, while righteous action, as a facilitator of meaning, plays a role in the emergence of this new concept. Here, it must be added that intensity in Imān and Tâslīm leads to an increase in these concepts and in their product, namely, Tâqwā. Similarly, Imān and Tâqwā, as the semantic organs of Iḥsān, lead to the emergence of this concept and to the intensification of its degree. Here again, the concept of righteous action functions as a facilitating factor. Therefore, what causes Iḥsān to emerge from the combination of Imān and Tâqwā is righteous action; and, fundamentally, Iḥsān is of the nature of high-quality righteous action. This means that Tâqwā, when adorned with high-quality righteous action, guides the human being toward Iḥsān. Finally, in examining the effects of the combination of Tâqwā and Iḥsān, we have concluded that the shared effects of their combination are divine companionship (mâʿiyyât -e- ilāhī), great reward, divine forgiveness and mercy, and cancelling out the sins. روشِ «تحلیلِ معناشناختیِ واژگانی» یکی از روش‌های مناسب برای بررسیِ ساختمانِ معناییِ واژه‌های قرآن است. این روش در پژوهش‌های معنا‌شناختی بسیار اهمّیّت دارد. در این مقاله با این روش به معناشناسیِ واژگانیِ دو واژۀ «تقوا» و «احسان» ‌پرداخته‌ایم و اعضا و کیفیّاتِ معنایی آنها را با استفاده از آیاتِ قرآن احصا کرده‌ایم؛ زیرا مفاهیمِ این دو واژه در اخلاقِ قرآنی جایگاهِ ویژه و ممتازی دارند. گفتنی است که، در این مقاله، تعابیرِ «عضوِ معنایی» و «کیفیّتِ معنایی» را برای نخستین‌بار در بسترِ روشِ «تحلیلِ معناشناختیِ واژگانی» مطرح کرده‌ایم. بر اساسِ آیاتِ قرآن به این نتیجه رسیدیم که «اسلام»، «ایمان» و «عملِ صالح» اعضای معناییِ تقوا و «بازدارندگی»، «تشکیکی بودن» و «استمرار» کیفیّاتِ معناییِ آن هستند؛ همچنین، «ایمان»، «تقوا» و «عملِ صالح» اعضای معناییِ احسان و «تفضّل»، «کیفیّت‌خواهی» و «پیش‌برندگی» کیفیّاتِ معناییِ آن هستند. در رابطه‌یابی میانِ مفاهیمِ این دو واژه به دو گونه رابطۀ «تولیدی» و «تزایدی» دست یافتیم و به این نتیجه رسیدیم که آثارِ مشترکِ ترکیبِ ساختمانِ معناییِ آنها عبارتند از: «معیّتِ الاهی»، «اجرِ عظیم»، «غفران و رحمتِ الاهی» و «تکفیرِ گناهان». این پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که واژه‌های قرآنی از لحاظِ معناشناختی ویژگی‌هایی دارند که افزون بر هر یک از اجزای تشکیل‌دهندۀ معنا که از آنها به «عضوِ معنایی» تعبیر کردیم، کُلّ متشکّل از اعضای معنایی نیز دارای آنهاست و ما آن ویژگی‌ها را «کیفیّاتِ معنایی» می‌نامیم.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106695_1c2081e55797c80a0b0b3327bda5e063.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 A Comparative Study of the Extensive Role of Practical Reason in the Ethical Thought of Immanuel Kant and Mullā Ṣadrā بررسی تطبیقی نقش گستردۀ عقل عملی در اندیشۀ اخلاقی ایمانوئل کانت و ملاصدرا 219 236 106696 10.48308/jiethics.2026.243015.1047 FA وحید رئوف مقدم دانشجوی دکتری فلسفۀ اخلاق، دانشکده الاهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران (نویسنده مسئول). 0009-0007-6038-2521 سید احمد فاضلی گروه فلسفۀ اخلاق، دانشکده الاهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. 0009-0000-8105-3187 Journal Article 2025 12 24 Introduction: Among Islamic moral thinkers—similar to Kantian ethical thought—the role of practical reason is highly prominent and is regarded as the sole gateway to true wisdom. This paper examines the extensive role of practical reason from the perspectives of Immanuel Kant—one of the most influential figures in the rationalist tradition of contemporary Western philosophy—and Mulla Sadra, the founder of Transcendent Philosophy (al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliyah). Findings: From Kant’s perspective, only the individual who adheres to the dictates of practical reason is genuinely free and possesses a form of life that transcends mere animal existence. Moral laws are universal, as they are grounded in the “transcendental self” and thus constitute a single, common reality for all human beings. Kant also grounds all theological proofs in practical reason and maintains that transcendence beyond the realm of sensible experience is possible only within the domain of practical reason. questions: l First, does practical reason contain a determinate list of moral rules? l If the grounds of moral obligation are supplied by practical reason, are the justification, truth, and validity of moral decisions genuinely guaranteed? For example, patience is considered good because it is an effective means for achieving goals, but is it also morally true and justified? l Is mere harmony and conformity with the structure of practical reason, by itself, sufficient to count as a moral reason or argument? l Does conformity with the structure of practical reason adequately secure the universality and exceptionlessness of moral obligations, as Kant intends? l Do the diverse manifestations of practical reason across different cultures undermine the stability of moral judgments? In contrast to Kant, Mulla Sadra holds that ultimate transcendence beyond sensible experience and the attainment of true happiness depend on the theoretical intellect’s access to the knowledge of higher metaphysical realities. However, as long as the soul remains entangled in lower-level perceptions and needs, the theoretical intellect cannot ascend to the realm of higher intelligibles. Practical reason, through voluntary development and the free governance of the soul’s faculties, removes these impediments and enables the theoretical intellect to pursue truth. With the flourishing of practical reason, human beings attain moral good, and this achievement represents a significant manifestation of voluntary substantial perfection. In Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, practical reason possesses a cognitive dimension and is strengthened through disciplined engagement in discerning real moral goods and evils. points: l The cognitive dimension of practical reason guarantees moral justification, truth, and validity. l Harmony with the cognitive aspect of practical reason ensures the universality and exceptionlessness of moral rules. l The cognitive dimension of practical reason is capable of generating moral reasons and arguments. l Moreover, the cognitive and perceptual orientation of practical reason manifests a unified character across different cultures. Discussion: One of the most significant points of divergence between the two views concerns the function of practical reason. In Kant’s dual-aspect framework, practical reason belongs to the inner, noumenal, or supra-phenomenal realm rather than the external, phenomenal realm. While causal necessity governs the phenomenal world, the noumenal realm is governed by the rules of pure reason. By contrast, in Mulla Sadra’s unitive metaphysical framework, practical reason, in one respect, is merely the soul’s motivational faculty responsible for regulating its powers, and in another respect, it is a cognitive faculty tasked with discerning morally beautiful actions from morally reprehensible ones. قوای انسان به باور کانت از «شناخت» و «میل» و «درک‌کنندۀ لذت و ألم» تشکیل شده است؛ شناخت به سه قوۀ فاهمه (عقل نظری) و عقل عملی و حکم تقسیم می‌شود. چنانچه فاهمه واجد مقولات شروط شناخت می‌باشد، عقل عملی نیز سه شرط پیشین اختیار و قانون و دستور مطلق دارد. از نظر ملاصدرا «عقل نظری» و «عقل عملی» فاقد ساختار پیشین؛ اولی وظیفۀ شناخت و دومی از شأنی وظیفۀ شناخت احکام اخلاقی و از شأنی به تعدیل نفس می‌پردازد. نظریۀ دو اندیشمند از سویی تشابهی مانند نقش دستیابی عقل عملی به قوانین اخلاقی، ثبات و عمومیت قوانین اخلاقی برآمده از عقل عملی برخوردار است؛ از سوی دیگر امتیازات دارد: کانت دو ساحت مجزا برای عقل نظری و عقل عملی باور دارد و براهین الاهیاتی و فراروی از حس را اختصاصی عقل عملی می‌داند. ملاصدرا هر دو گونه از عقل را شئون عالیۀ نفس واحد می‌داند و عقل عملی را آزادی‌بخش عقل نظری دستیابی به مراحل عالی از شناخت و سعادت حقیقی را از جانب عقل نظری می‌داند؛ سؤالاتی همانند اینکه آیا در نظام اخلاقی کانت «توجیه»، «صدق»، «دلیلیت» و «کلیت و استثناناپذیری» احکام اخلاقی به درستی تأمین می‌شود، پیش می‌آید که در اندیشۀ ملاصدرا به دلیل برخورداری عقل عملی از نظر شناختی جواب دارد. روش پژوهش متن حاضر، کتابخانه‌ای و به‌گونه تحلیلی ـ توصیفی بوده است.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106696_8afc49cdf45c74ef46d1651ca071a1a3.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 Examining the Level of Alignment of Environmental and Natural Resource Legal Regulations with Bioethical Principles and Religious Teachings بررسی سطح انطباق قوانین حقوقی مرتبط با محیط‌زیست و منابع طبیعی، با مبانی اخلاق زیستی و آموزه‌های دینی 237 258 106671 10.48308/jiethics.2026.242600.1040 FA زینب آقاشریعتمداری گروه علوم و زیست فناوری گیاهی، دانشکده علوم و فناوری زیستی، دانشگاه شهیدبهشتی، تهران، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) 0000-0003-4218-1607 فاطمه ثقة‌الاسلامی دانش‌آموختۀ سطح دو جامعة ‌الزهرا(س)، قم، ایران. 0000-0003-4218-1607 Journal Article 2025 11 23 Introduction: The environment and natural resources are essential assets and foundational pillars of sustainable development, holding a significant position in contemporary legal systems. However, the intensification of crises such as climate change, species extinction, and widespread pollution indicates that existing laws have largely failed to curb this degradation. The root of this inefficacy can be traced to the dominance of an anthropocentric mindset within legislative frameworks, a mindset that defines nature merely as an instrument for fulfilling human needs and fails to recognize its intrinsic value. In this context, two intellectual systems, bioethics and religious teachings, can offer deeper, value-based theoretical foundations for critiquing and reforming existing laws and developing more comprehensive legislation. The main objective of this article is to examine the level of alignment and the feasibility of integrating these three domains (law, bioethics, and religious teachings) to establish a unified analytical framework. Findings: The examination of these three domains reveals distinct and often contrasting findings: 1- The Prevailing Legal System (International and National): Analysis of documents such as the Stockholm Declaration (1972) and domestic laws indicates that the dominant discourse is anthropocentric. In this discourse, the environment is either viewed as the "common heritage of humanity" or as the basis for realizing the "human right to a healthy environment." A consequence of this perspective is that criminalizing environmental destruction is contingent upon proving harm to human health or interests. This approach disregards the independent legal personality and intrinsic value of nature. 2- Bioethical Principles: In branches of bioethics such as ecocentric ethics, intrinsic value is ascribed to all components of nature. Concepts like intergenerational justice and ecosystem integrity are central to this field. Intergenerational justice emphasizes that the present generation bears an ethical responsibility to ensure that future generations can benefit from natural resources and a healthy environment. Ecosystem integrity necessitates a holistic perspective in which interconnected natural components are protected as a unified "whole," rather than focusing solely on individual species or specific resources. 3- Religious Teachings of Islam: The Islamic perspective on nature is rooted in a monotheistic worldview. In this view, nature constitutes a collection of divine signs, manifesting God's power, wisdom, and mercy. Consequently, it possesses dignity and intrinsic value. Humanity is the trustee of these divine blessings on Earth. This status imposes a profound ethical and religious responsibility upon humans: the duty to protect, nurture, and utilize resources sustainably. Concepts such as "reviving the earth," "prohibition of corruption and waste," and "accountability for divine blessings and future generations" within Islamic texts provide a robust foundation for a relationship with nature based on respect and responsibility. Environmental protection within this intellectual framework is a religious duty and an expression of devotion. Discussion: The comparison and contrast of these three discourses reveal a profound theoretical gap. Existing laws, with their focus on short-term, tangible human interests, at best attempt to manage damages rather than prevent their occurrence. These laws lack the deep ethical foundation necessary to enforce a trans-species commitment and respect for the integrity of the ecosystem. Conversely, both bioethical and Islamic systems, by grounding themselves in the intrinsic value of nature and defining human responsibility towards the entirety of creation, enable the formulation of preventive, holistic, and justice-oriented laws. To bridge this gap and connect theory with practice, this article proposes an integrated framework derived from the systematic synthesis of key components from the three domains. These principles can serve as criteria for evaluating existing laws and as a roadmap for future legislation: The principle of intrinsic value and trusteeship (recognizing nature's inherent dignity); The principle of human responsibility and duty-Orientation (emphasizing active human stewardship in protection, restoration, and balance); The principle of intergenerational and intra-ecosystemic justice (guaranteeing the rights of future generations and all ecosystem components); The principle of holistic integrity and health (adopting a systemic, unified perspective on health); The principle of the right to a healthy environment (as a fundamental legal standard). It should be noted that transitioning from the current purely anthropocentric legal system to one that incorporates these five principles requires a paradigm shift in the philosophical foundations of legislation, prioritizing long-term ecological interests over short-term economic gains, and culturally promoting a worldview of respect toward nature. مفاهیمی مانند محیط‌زیست و منابع طبیعی محور اصلی توسعۀ پایدار در جوامع امروزی به‌شمار می‌‌روند و همواره به‌عنوان بخشی از سرمایۀ ملی کشورها مورد توجه بخش قانون‌گذار بوده‌اند. این مقاله به بررسی سطح انطباق قوانین حقوقی مرتبط با محیط‌زیست و منابع طبیعی، با مبانی اخلاق زیستی و آموزه‌های دینی می‌پردازد. هدف اصلی این پژوهش ارزیابی چگونگی تأثیر اصول اخلاق زیستی بر توسعۀ قوانین محیط‌زیستی و همچنین نقش آموزه‌های دینی در شکل‌دهی رویکردهای قانونی در حفاظت از منابع طبیعی است. در این مقاله به مفاهیمی مانند مسئولیت انسانی، عدالت بین‌نسلی و یکپارچگی اکوسیستم اشاره خواهد شد. یافته‌های این مطالعه نشان‌دهندۀ غلبۀ رویکرد انسان‌محور در قوانین موجود زیست‌محیطی و عدم درنظرگیری ارزش ذاتی طبیعت در آنهاست؛ همچنین انطباق این قوانین با مبانی اخلاق زیستی و آموزه‌های دینی نشانگر عدم پرداخت مناسب به برخی اصول بنیادین در قوانین حقوقی است که مهم‌ترین آنها عبارتند از: اصل ارزش ذاتی طبیعت و لزوم امانتداری، اصل تکلیف‌گرایی انسان و نیز اصل یکپارچگی زیست‌بوم. نتایج تحقیق بیانگر ضرورت توجه ویژه به رویکرد زیست‌محور به‌موازات رویکرد انسان‌محور در وضع قوانین یادشده است؛ به‌طوری‌که با چنین رویکردی بخشی از قانون‌گذاری و سیاست‌گذاری‌های محیط‌زیستی می‌بایست با اصالت‌بخشی ذاتی به محیط‌زیست انجام پذیرد؛ به‌عبارت دقیق‌تر در یک جامعۀ توحیدی با نظام فکری اسلامی، حفاظت از محیط‌زیست نه یک انتخاب راهبردی که تجلّی مستقیم جهان‌بینی توحیدی و جلوه‌ای از حضور مسئولانۀ انسان در مقام خلیفه‌الله است. این دیدگاه پشتوانه‌ای استوار برای مقابله با چالش‌های نوین زیست‌محیطی از بحران تغییرات اقلیمی تا تخریب روزافزون تنوع زیستی به‌شمار می‌رود.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106671_2f19d9aa2413f3265b58d130ca4865ea.pdf

دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 Moral Literacy: Meaning, Foundations, and Obstacles سواد اخلاقی: معنا، مبانی و موانع 259 279 106653 10.48308/jiethics.2026.239102.1003 FA مسعود صادقی گروه اخلاق پزشکی، دانشکده پزشکی، دانشگاه علوم پزشکی، کرمانشاه، ایران. Journal Article 2025 03 09 Introduction: The role and meaning of literacy in the modern world is a very complex and even amazing category because not only was it a factor in the gradual realization of the Renaissance in the past, but now, in the digital age, it has become the basis or necessity of everything, in such a way that it is almost impossible to experience a normal life without it. In parallel with the increasing changes in the world, the definition and scope of literacy is also undergoing constant change to the point where the category of literacies has practically replaced the classical concept of literacy and has added to the complexity of the issue. Computer literacy, emotional literacy, electronic literacy, Internet literacy, and moral literacy are among the most important emerging branches that have narrowed the space for the traditional understanding of the concept of literacy. The main question and issue in this article is about what moral literacy is and its role in the current world, that is, the world of two spaces. In fact, the following article wants to analyze the possibility of realizing something called moral literacy from the perspective of philosophy/philosophy of ethics. In other words, the debate is about whether moral literacy is possible and feasible, and if so, is it also desirable and desirable? Based on the answer to this question, another question is: What are the conceptual foundations of the formation of moral literacy and how does it relate to popular theories from a meta-ethical perspective? In light of these questions, it is easier to see whether moral literacy is more of a skill or information, and whether these two are more global or local. Findings: Two main approaches can be taken regarding the content that can be transferred in the form of moral literacy: the normative approach and the skill approach. In the normative approach to the content and meaning of moral literacy, the transfer and education of two general categories of norms are discussed: global norms and local norms. But what is meant by global and local norms and how can we draw a boundary between them? There are relatively diverse ways to define and distinguish between the two. For example, through a descriptive study, we can say that universal norms are those that are common and accepted in all or most cultures or moral traditions of the world, such as fairness and truthfulness, and local norms are those that are only seen in some cultures or moral traditions, such as the religious veil common among Muslims or religious Jews. Of course, this is not the only way to distinguish between universal and local moral norms. Instead of a purely descriptive study, meta-ethical or philosophical methods can be used. For example, norms that can be proven or explained regardless of a specific religious or cultural perspective can be called universal or general moral norms, and norms that can only be understood or justified within a specific religious or cultural tradition or system can be called local or specific norms. Discussion: It is clear that a detailed and in-depth study in this field is not the subject of this article, nor can its extensive dimensions be well handled here. Here I am only saying that when we are able to include moral norms in both global and local or general and specific formats in every reasonable and possible way, then we have removed a significant part of the obstacles to the development and teaching of moral literacy. You may ask why and how? The answer is that when we are able to level morality, then in determining the content of moral literacy we will be able to either be content with teaching global or general norms or teach the accepted and acceptable norms according to the situation (religious, cultural, geographical, etc.) of the learners. In the skills approach to the content and content of moral literacy, unlike the previous approach, the challenge of whether the teachings are global or local, general or specific is no longer a big issue. Why? Because the discussion is fundamentally about moral living skills rather than principles or norms or moral qualities. In this approach to the content of moral literacy, the methods and skills of being good are in focus, not what is good and what is bad! The nature of methods and skills is that they are largely cross-cultural and generally universal. Ethical skills and methods are mostly formal, organic, and instrumental, and lack evaluative aspects. مسئله اصلی این مقاله تحلیل مفهومی «سواد اخلاقی» و امکان تلقی معلومات اخلاقی به مثابه نوعی سواد (سوادانگاری علم اخلاق) است. بحث نه تنها به چگونگی آموزش اخلاق، بلکه مهم‌تر از آن به اصل تعلیم‌پذیری اخلاق و امکان آن بازمی‌گردد. می‌دانیم که از «عصر سواد» به «عصر سوادها» گذر کرده‌ایم، هرچند این گذار به معنای پایان سواد کلاسیک نیست. مدارس در جهان غرب عموماً با احتیاط بسیار با مسئلۀ آموزش اخلاق مواجه می‌شوند؛ از همین رو در نخستین کاربردهای محدود اصطلاح «سواد اخلاقی»، نوعی تسامح یا حتی جنبه تفننی مشهود است. سواد اخلاقی، همانند سایر گونه‌های سواد، مستلزم یادگیری و تمرین است؛ یعنی یادگیری اصول یا قواعدی عینی است. پذیرش این مفهوم با قبول چند پیش‌فرض فرااخلاقی همراه است: اخلاق قابل انتقال و آموزش است؛ اخلاق امری غیرشخصی و غیرخصوصی است که در موقعیت‌های متعارض اخلاقی امکان داوری و صدور حکم بر مبنای معیارهایی مشخص و عینی وجود دارد. چهار مانع اصلی در مسیر بحث عمومی و سوادانگاری اخلاق قابل شناسایی است: نخست، تصور عدم توافق مردم بر سر راه‌حل مسائل اخلاقی؛ دوم، تصور ناتوانی در قضاوت نسبت به دیگران؛ سوم، تلقی اخلاق به مثابه امری کاملاً خصوصی؛ و چهارم، نسبی‌انگاری فرهنگی. بر پایۀ یافته‌های مقاله، می‌توان دو رویکرد اصلی دربارۀ محتوای قابل انتقال در قالب سواد اخلاقی از یکدیگر بازشناخت: رویکرد هنجاری و رویکرد مهارتی.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106653_31715020b752de71b7079e270ea782d6.pdf