دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مطالعات میان رشته ای اخلاق 3116-0905 1 2 2025 09 23 Applying the "Ugliness of the Eagle of Belabian" Rule in Solving Ethical Problems کاربرد قاعده «قبح عقاب بلابیان» در حل مسائل معرفت اخلاقی 49 70 106394 10.48308/jiethics.2025.241670.1028 FA بهروز محمدی منفرد گروه اخلاق، دانشکده اندیشه اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. 0000-0002-6589-6704 Journal Article 2025 09 23 Introduction: In Usul (principles of jurisprudence), rational and textual discussions are organized to resolve jurisprudential and religious issues. However, its impact extends beyond Fiqh (jurisprudence) and can play a role in moral epistemology. Extending the principle of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān (the ugliness of punishment without clarification) to resolve issues in moral epistemology means it has the following applications as a Justified Practical Knowledge: l In confronting moral doubts; l As a source against moral epistemic skepticism; l Resolving issues of applying moral knowledge to concrete subjects. Findings: 1) The Nature of the Rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān The rational principle, Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān, states that punishing or blaming a person for performing or omitting an act, without a valid religious clarification (Shar’ī) or a sound rational argument (Dalīl 'Aqlī) for the obligation, is ugly (qubīh). Therefore, if an agent doubts the ruling of a religious act and has not received any valid clarification, reason deems the principle of Barā’ah (innocence/exemption) to prevail, and the obligation is negated. 2) The Rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān and Moral Epistemic Skepticism Moral epistemic skepticism asserts that access to certain moral truths is impossible. However, the rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān acts as a form of Justified Practical Knowledge, rescuing the skeptical agent from inability. 3) The Rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān: The Basis of Moral Exemption in Moral Doubt Moral doubt occurs when an individual knows general moral principles but is ambiguous about a specific action. In such situations, the rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān provides the rational basis for moral exemption (Barā’ah); meaning, after review and finding no valid clarification regarding the badness of an act, reason rules that the agent is exempt from moral blame and responsibility. The principle of moral exemption has two consequences: l A) Necessity of Non-Blame by the Observer (External Judge): l B) Moral Responsibility Following Moral Exemption: 4) The Rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān and the Challenge of Applying Moral Knowledge to Subjects The error of applying moral knowledge (Tajarrī Akhlāqī or moral transgression/ presumption) occurs when an individual intends to violate a moral law (e.g., lying), but their action, in reality, conforms to the actual moral ruling (they tell the truth). Based on the rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān: Since the agent in this state lacks valid clarification regarding the wrongness of their current act (because their knowledge was erroneous), reason rules for their moral exemption. Therefore, moral transgression resulting from a misapplication error entails no moral blame or responsibility (neither based on intention nor result), because accountability without clear clarification is ugly. Discussion: By utilizing discussions from Usul studies, one can achieve a deeper understanding of the role of “Clarification” (Bayān) and the level of moral awareness in the possibility of acting upon the contents of moral propositions. From this perspective, the rule of Qubḥ-e 'Uqāb Bilā Bayān is not merely an Usūlī rule confined to Fiqh, but rather an epistemological foundation for moral judgment in cases of doubt. This rule, as a rational criterion, enables decision-making regarding behaviors or attitudes whose moral wrongness or badness lacks clear clarification. Hence, it can be considered a basis for moral exemption and the organization of moral epistemology in doubtful situations. پژوهش حاضر به بررسی امکان بهره‌گیری از قاعده عقلی قبح عقاب بلابیان در حوزه معرفت اخلاقی می‌پردازد. این قاعده که در علم اصول مبنای اصل برائت عقلی به شمار می‌رود، دلالت بر این دارد که در صورتِ نبودِ بیانِ روشن درباره حکمِ شرعیِ فعلی، هیچ‌گونه الزام یا استحقاق عقاب بر انسان مکلّف متوجه نخواهد بود. از آنجا که این قاعده اساساً عقلی است، می‌توان دامنه مفهومی آن را به قلمرو اخلاق نیز گسترش داد و آن را به مثابه معرفت عملی موجه در مواجهه با مسائل معرفت اخلاقی دانست. بر این اساس پژوهش حاضر سه هدف اصلی را دنبال می‌کند: 1. به‌کارگیری قاعده قبح عقاب بلابیان در مواجهه با شکاکیت معرفتی اخلاقی؛ 2. کاربست آن برای حل تردید اخلاقی در مقام عمل و 3. پاسخ به چالش تطبیق معرفت اخلاقی بر موضوعات مشتبه. فرایند پژوهش بدین شکل است که در بخش نخست، ماهیت قاعده قبح عقاب بلابیان و نقطه مقابل آن، یعنی قاعده دفع ضرر محتمل بررسی و سپس کارکرد این قاعده در حوزه معرفت اخلاقی تحلیل می‌شود. نتیجه پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که هرچند این قاعده در بافت شریعت اسلامی معنا و کارآمدی بیشتری دارد، می‌توان آن را در چارچوب اخلاق توحیدی و حتی سایر نظریه‌های اخلاقی به ‌منزله ابزاری برای حل مسائل معرفت اخلاق یادشده به کار گرفت.

https://jiethics.sbu.ac.ir/article_106394_da03c56706e8bd70decfb15fff7d5d3f.pdf